"Supreme Court strength raised to 38 via Money Bill route amid constitutional controversy"
Article 124(1)
Constitutional provision empowering Parliament to fix the number of Supreme Court judges by law.
Money Bill (Article 110)
Legislation dealing with taxation, Consolidated Fund appropriation, or incidental matters; Rajya Sabha cannot veto it.
The strength of the Supreme Court of India is not fixed by the Constitution itself but is left to Parliament to determine by law — a deliberate design choice reflecting the framers' expectation that judicial workload would grow over time. Article 124(1) originally provided for a Chief Justice and not more than seven other judges, with Parliament explicitly empowered to increase this number by legislation. The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956 has been the primary vehicle for successive increases: from 8 judges at inception, to 14 in 1960, to 18 in 1977, to 26 in 1986, to 31 in 2009, and most recently to 34 (including the Chief Justice) under the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Act, 2019. Each expansion has been driven by the same underlying concern: a widening gap between the volume of cases filed and the court's capacity to hear and decide them.
The constitutional framework for judicial appointments is governed by the collegium system — a judge-led mechanism that evolved through the Second Judges Case (S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1993) and the Third Judges Case (In re Special Reference, 1998), which established that the Chief Justice and the four most senior judges of the Supreme Court hold primacy in recommending appointments. This insulates appointment decisions from political control, but the institutional capacity of the Court — how many judges may sit — remains a parliamentary prerogative, creating a structural interface between legislative and judicial authority. Any expansion of sanctioned strength therefore inevitably intersects with questions about how quickly vacancies can be filled under the collegium process.
The persistent gap between sanctioned strength and actual working strength has been a structural problem for Indian justice delivery. Even when the sanctioned strength is fully occupied, India's judge-to-population ratio remains among the lowest for major democracies — a fact that directly feeds the crisis of judicial pendency and has repeatedly prompted calls for institutional expansion.
The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Bill, 2026 amends the 1956 Act by substituting the judge count from 34 to 38 judges (including the Chief Justice), adding four new positions to the bench. The government's justification for the expansion rests on the familiar argument of mounting arrears: the Supreme Court's docket has grown substantially, and additional judges are needed to constitute more benches and clear pending matters more efficiently.
A significant constitutional controversy surrounds the Bill's classification as a Money Bill under Article 110. A Money Bill is defined as one dealing with taxation, appropriation of funds from the Consolidated Fund of India or the Contingency Fund of India, regulation of government borrowing, or any matter incidental to these — the last category being the operative clause under Article 110(1)(g). …
Regarding Money Bill, which of the following statements is not correct ?
Which of the following statements are correct in respect of a Money Bill in the Parliament?
1.Article 109 mentions special procedure in respect of Money Bills.
2.A Money Bill shall not be introduced in the Council of States.
3.The Rajya Sabha can either approve the Bill or suggest changes but cannot reject it.
4.Amendments to a Money Bill suggested by the Rajya Sabha have to be accepted by the Lok Sabha.
Select the answer using the code given below:
With reference to Finance Bill and Money Bill in the Indian Parliament, consider the following statements:
1.When the Lok Sabha transmits Finance Bill to the Rajya Sabha, it can amend or reject the Bill.
2.When the Lok Sabha transmits Money Bill to the Rajya Sabha, it cannot amend or reject the Bill, it can only make recommendations.
3.In the case of disagreement between the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha, there is no joint sitting for Money Bill, but a joint sitting becomes necessary for Finance Bill.
How many of the above statements are correct?
Consider the following statements:
1.The Rajya Sabha has no power either to reject or to amend a Money Bill.
2.The Rajya Sabha cannot vote on the Demands for Grants.
3.The Rajya Sabha cannot discuss the Annual Financial Statement.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Which of the following correctly describes the Rajya Sabha's role when a Money Bill is transmitted to it by the Lok Sabha?
Assertion (A): The government classified the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Bill, 2026 as a Money Bill under Article 110.
Reason (R): Article 110(1)(g) permits any matter incidental to the subjects listed in Articles 110(1)(a)–(f) to be included in a Money Bill.
Which of the following is correct?
The 'dominant-purpose test' in the context of Money Bills refers to which of the following?
Want the full note, Prelims Facts & MCQ answers?
Create a free account — takes less than a minute.
Create free account