India-US partnership shifts from shared China concerns to strategic complementarity

India-US relations have traversed a long arc from Cold War estrangement — rooted in India's Non-Alignment Movement and Soviet proximity — to what both governments now describe as a 'Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership.' The strategic pivot began with the 2008 Civil Nuclear Agreement, which granted India access to civilian nuclear technology despite its non-signatory status to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This remains the single most consequential structural shift in bilateral relations, signalling US acceptance of India as a de facto nuclear power. Subsequent years saw the formalisation of foundational defence agreements — LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement, 2016), COMCASA (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement, 2018), and BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement, 2020) — enabling deeper military interoperability. The partnership was further elevated at the June 2023 state visit to Washington, institutionalising cooperation in critical and emerging technologies through the iCET (Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology), covering semiconductors, artificial intelligence, space, and defence innovation.

The strategic logic underpinning this partnership has, until recently, been driven primarily by China's rise as Washington's principal strategic competitor. India's geographic position, democratic credentials, and growing economic weight made it a natural partner in US efforts to shape a free and open Indo-Pacific. The Quad (India, US, Australia, Japan), revived at the leader level in 2021, became the most visible multilateral expression of this convergence. Crucially, India's participation in these frameworks has always been calibrated through the lens of strategic autonomy — engaging without binding treaty commitments, preserving independent decision-making space.