Mecca Joint Defence Accord reveals limits of Islamic regional solidarity

West Asia has historically lacked a binding collective-defence architecture comparable to NATO's Article 5. Institutions built on supranational identity — the Arab League (founded 1945), the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC, established 1981) — have repeatedly failed to translate declarations into collective action. The GCC itself was born partly as a collective response to revolutionary Iran and the Iran-Iraq War, yet could not prevent three of its members from blockading Qatar in 2017. Earlier experiments such as the United Arab Republic (1958–1961), the Baghdad Pact (1955), and the Regional Cooperation for Development (later reconstituted as the Economic Cooperation Organisation) all dissolved as national interest consistently overrode supranational solidarity.

Into this structural vacuum, bilateral relationships — particularly the longstanding Pakistan-Saudi Arabia axis — have operated informally, with Pakistan providing military training, advisory personnel, and strategic depth to Gulf monarchies that possess financial power but face institutional limitations in their national armies. Turkey, a NATO member since 1952, adds a distinct layer: it has developed a substantial indigenous defence-industrial base and has increasingly positioned itself as an autonomous regional power, often diverging from NATO partners on policy toward Israel and the Palestinian question. The post-2003 period — marked by the Iraq War's destabilising aftermath, the rise of ISIS, the Houthi insurgency in Yemen, and Iran's expanding 'Axis of Resistance' — progressively eroded confidence in the US-centric security order. The Abraham Accords of 2020 represented one response, but the October 2023 Gaza war shattered that diplomatic momentum, deepened Arab public hostility toward Israel, and exposed the limits of US leverage, leaving the region actively searching for alternative security arrangements.