"Tribunal Reforms Bill 2026 passed amid concerns over NTC independence"
Article 323A
constitutional provision empowering Parliament to create tribunals for public service recruitment and conditions disputes.
Article 323B
empowers Parliament/state legislatures to create tribunals for taxation, industrial disputes, land reforms, and other subjects.
Tribunals in India are quasi-judicial bodies created by statute to adjudicate specialised disputes — covering domains such as income tax, customs, armed forces, company law, environment, and service matters — thereby relieving the regular court system of technical and high-volume litigation. Their constitutional basis lies in Articles 323A and 323B, inserted by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, which authorised Parliament and state legislatures to establish administrative and other tribunals respectively. Article 323A specifically empowers Parliament to create tribunals for disputes relating to recruitment and service conditions of public servants — the basis for the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 — while Article 323B covers taxation, industrial disputes, land reforms, and elections.
Over subsequent decades, specialised bodies such as the National Green Tribunal (NGT), the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), and the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) were established under their respective parent statutes. This proliferation occurred without a unified oversight architecture, producing inconsistent appointment processes, executive interference in member selection, and delays that defeated the very purpose of specialised adjudication. The Supreme Court intervened early: in S.P. Sampath Kumar (1987) it upheld the tribunal system but insisted on independence safeguards; in L. Chandra Kumar (1997) it held that tribunals cannot oust High Court jurisdiction and that judicial review by High Courts is part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
The most recent prior legislative attempt — the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, partly routed through the Finance Act, 2017 — gave the executive disproportionate control over appointments and prescribed short, renewable tenures. The Supreme Court struck down key provisions in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India and Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd., holding that prescribing a minimum age of 50 years for members and a four-year tenure violated the separation of powers and the constitutional benchmarks the Court had itself laid down. The structural accountability gap thus remained unaddressed, setting the stage for fresh legislation.
The central structural tension in tribunal design is that these bodies exercise judicial functions yet their members are appointed by the executive, their salaries determined by the government, and their tenures historically subject to executive discretion. The Supreme Court's repeated interventions have established a clear doctrinal framework: tribunal members must enjoy security of tenure, independence from the ministry whose subject matter they adjudicate, and conditions of service that insulate them from executive pressure. Any legislative scheme that falls short of these benchmarks risks being struck down as violating the separation of powers.
The Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2026 — passed by the Lok Sabha — proposes the creation of a National Tribunals Commission (NTC) as a unified supervisory and oversight body for tribunals across the country. The NTC is intended to address the structural accountability gap that neither the 2017 Finance Act route nor the 2021 Act resolved: the absence of an independent institution to oversee appointments, service conditions, infrastructure, and performance across the fragmented tribunal landscape. …
Consider the following statements:
1.The 44th Amendment to the Constitution of India introduced an Article placing the election of the Prime Minister beyond judicial review.
2.The Supreme Court of India struck down the 99th Amendment to the Constitution of India as being violative of the independence of judiciary.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
With reference to the Indian Parliament, consider the following statements:
1.A bill pending in the Lok Sabha lapses on its dissolution.
2.A bill passed by the Lok Sabha and pending in the Rajya Sabha lapses on the dissolution of the Lok Sabha.
3.A bill in regard to which the President of India notified his/her intention to summon the Houses to a joint sitting lapses on the dissolution of the Lok Sabha.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
With reference to the constitutional basis of tribunals in India, consider the following statements:
1.Articles 323A and 323B were inserted into the Constitution by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment.
2.Article 323A deals with tribunals for disputes relating to service matters of public servants, while Article 323B covers a wider range of other matters.
3.The Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar (1997) held that High Court jurisdiction over tribunal decisions can be completely excluded by Parliament.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
With reference to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on tribunals, which of the following pairs of case and holding is/are correctly matched?
1.S.P. Sampath Kumar (1987) — Tribunals can completely replace High Courts for service matters
2.L. Chandra Kumar (1997) — Judicial review by High Courts over tribunal decisions is part of the basic structure
3.Rojer Mathew (2019) — Recommended establishment of an independent, statutory National Tribunals Commission
Select the correct answer using the code given below:
Want the full note, Prelims Facts & MCQ answers?
Create a free account — takes less than a minute.
Create free account