India's military transformation hindered by intellectual leadership deficit

India's military command architecture has historically been organised along single-service lines, a legacy of the colonial model that prioritised tactical proficiency and regimental tradition over strategic integration. The Kargil Review Committee (1999) was the first systematic institutional acknowledgement that this model was operationally inadequate — the absence of tri-service jointness had been a demonstrable vulnerability during the Kargil conflict. Its recommendations catalysed the creation of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) and, two decades later, the landmark appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in 2019, tasked with driving tri-service integration and overseeing the eventual transition to theatre commands. India currently operates 17 single-service commands; the proposed restructuring would consolidate these into three integrated theatre commands. The Andaman and Nicobar Command (est. 2001) — India's only existing tri-service command — offers a cautionary precedent: structural integration has not automatically produced operational jointness.

The intellectual tradition within India's armed forces has a complex history. The post-colonial military inherited a strong anti-intellectual culture from the British, one that privileged tactical acumen, regimental ethos, and institutional conformity over strategic thinking and professional writing. It was not until the late 1980s that a concerted effort at intellectual transformation was attempted within the Army, with reverberations felt across all three services. The broader strategic community — civilian think-tanks, academic institutions, and retired officers — has since partially filled this gap, but the structural conditions within the active military have not kept pace.