"India Weighs De-Risking, Not Decoupling, From US and China"
De-risking
reducing strategic dependence on a country in specific sectors while maintaining broad economic ties.
Decoupling
a complete separation of two economies from each other.
India's foreign policy has long rested on the doctrine of strategic autonomy: the idea that India should retain the freedom to make independent choices in external relations rather than aligning permanently with any single power bloc. This traces back to the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War and has evolved into what is now often called multi-alignment, the pursuit of parallel partnerships with competing powers based on India's own interests rather than shared ideology.
This doctrine has been repeatedly tested by American secondary sanctions. When the US withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, three years after it was signed with Iran, India was forced to sharply cut its Iranian crude oil imports to avoid falling foul of US sanctions, even though Iran was a cost-effective supplier and a partner in the Chabahar Port project. That episode is now repeating in a different form. US pressure over Russian oil purchases following the Ukraine conflict has become the newest test of the same tension: India's economic interests versus its exposure to America's extraterritorial sanctions regime, which relies on the centrality of the US dollar in global trade to compel compliance even without any formal Indian legal obligation.
Actions against India go back further still. The US ended India's Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) trade benefits in 2019, and successive administrations have added tariffs on various Indian goods since. None of these measures have been reversed, even when the stated justification shifted, as seen in the on-again-off-again pressure over Venezuelan oil imports.
The immediate trigger is the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act 2026, passed by the US Congress, which allows the US President to impose tariffs of up to 100 per cent on the five largest buyers of Russian oil and gas: China, India, Slovakia, Hungary and Azerbaijan. European countries have been exempted on the argument that they are reducing Russian energy dependence, while these five face the threat in full. The power is discretionary: the President can use it as negotiating leverage rather than apply it immediately, consistent with the pattern of earlier threatened-but-unimplemented sanctions against India.
This has revived debate on whether India should pursue de-Americanisation, a deliberate reduction of dependence on the United States across trade, defence and diplomacy. …
"China is using its economic relations and positive trade surplus as tools to develop potential military power status in Asia." In the light of this statement, discuss its impact on India as her neighbour.
In what ways would the ongoing US-Iran Nuclear Pact Controversy affect the national interest of India? How should India respond to this situation?
Consider the following statements about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA):
1.It was signed in 2015 to restrict Iran's nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief.
2.The United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018.
3.India's crude oil imports from Iran increased sharply after the US withdrawal.
Which of the statements given above are correct?
The US policy of 'de-risking, not decoupling' with respect to China, as articulated around 2023, refers to which of the following approaches?
The US terminated India's benefits under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) in which year?
Consider the following countries:
1.China
2.Japan
3.India
4.Hungary
5.South Korea
According to the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act 2026 passed by the US Congress, how many of the above are among the top five buyers of Russian oil and gas targeted for tariffs of up to 100%?
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